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INTRODUCTION 
LCWE WANT NEITHER TO LEAD A MISERABLE 
LIFE ANY LONGER, NOR TO BE DRAGGED . 
INTO ANOTHER WAR." 
, d  
Thew words were spbken at a Japanese people's peace congress 
in Tokyo last December. Our generals and diplomats would prefer 
to Mkve that such a ,  protest comes only from Communist "agi- 
t~brs," trying to spoil American ''plans for -building Japan into a 
bdwark against Communism i6 Asia. ' Whether they themselves . 5; 
believe it or not2 the generals, and diplomats would ha*e it believedr9rr-;,% 
ff*K$ by, as many Americans as possible. For if it is not t r u e i f ,  instead,& , 
dragged into ano~her war.'' This statement rejects two dreadful alter- 
natives with which American policy has confronted Japan. Lest there 
be any doubt about those alternatives; U.S. Senator Willlam Know- 
alternative must include casting off American interference. Effo 
to disldge that' interference, in Japan as elsewhere in the worl 
will continue to be characterized by our diplomats ansE journalists 
as a "hate-America" campaign based on malicious falsehtmd or, at 
best, "misunderstanding of our motives." But this may prove to 
a shallow interpretation; as citizens, we need to lmk &neath to 
I 1 
9 
I. LLWe WW Not Be Dragged Into Another War" 8 
The painfully blistered fishermen and the contaminated tuna 
that came home to Japan in March, after the American hydrogen 
explosion in the Pacific, was written off here as an unfortunate acci- 
dent: Our scientists miscalculated. If we feel deeply the horror of our 
newest weapons, and of war itself, we must expect and understand 
the answering explosion of protest from the Japanese, that twice- 
burned people. It is not just because we insist on carrying on our I 
demolition practice in somebody else's back yard. Japanese involve- 
. 
ment in American war preparations has a much more direct effect 
on the lives and livelihood of the Japanese than any contaminated 
dust blown in from Eniwetok. 
The most obvious factor is the presence of American military 
forces and their elaborate, far-flung installations in Japan. After 
Japan's defeat in World War I1 their presence was supposed to 
symbolize American surveillance against a resurgence of Japanese 
arined imperialism. But the-presence of American troops in Japan 
today means something else again. Ostensibly defending the country, 
it continually threatens to involve Japw in somebody else's war; 
under the less palatable guise of defending American interests in the 
Far East, it binds Japan to the side of Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai- 
shek and Bao Dai. This very physical presence of foreign troops 
makes itself felt in a hundred ways. Here are some illuminating 
episodes from the annals of the past year: 
Because of heavy troop losses in the mountains of Korea, the 
united States Army looked for a mountainous area in'-Japan to use 
as a maneuvering ground. They chose the Myogi Mountain area 
in Gunma Prefecture. The inhabitants of the area protested im- 
mediately; in June 1953 a "compromise" meeting was held, the re- 
sults of which were so unsatisfactory that the Japanese workers 
and peasants walked out en masse. Six months later the battle was 
still on. U.S. Army maneuvers had been twice postponed because 
the people of the prefecture would not permit the troops yo enter? 
Asamayama District, a volcanic region 140 kilometers northwest 
of Tokyo, was also chosen as a U.S. maneuvering ground. In this 
case distinguished Japanese scientists joined in the protests. - That 
particular area has S e n  in use by the Seismological Research In- 
stitute of Tokyo for some twenty years for the study of earthquakes, - 
a form of natural disaster in which Japan has an intense interest.?. 
Last summer *US. military forces leased a strech of sand dunes 
near Uchinada, a fishing port on the Sea of fapan, as a testing 
ground for muniuons made by Japanese manufacturers. It meant 
that off-shore fishing would be prohibited near Uchinada, a village 
of 7,000 kople, and that the thunder of artillery would become a 
daily phenomenon. Tourist tr&c would also be affected. Uch'iada 
became a national issue. The assembly of the prefecture voted unani- 
mously against the permanent use of the area as a firihg range. 
A thousand residents of Uchinada staged a sit-down strike; they dus- 
tered just outside the fenced-in: area, while another thousand demon- 
strated in the streets. That day the US. forces had to use only short- 
range ammunition. Two weeks later hundreds of villagers clashed 
with 300 armed Japanese police in another demonstration against 
the firing rangem4 
Early in 1952 it was estimated5 that U.S. military requisitioning of 
land had passed the 70,000-acre mark; another estimate a year latera 
gave the number of U.S. bases as 735, and the amount of land covered 
by these bases and used by U.S. miiltary forces as over 250,000 acres. ' 
, When a population half as big as that of the United States is squeezed 
into an area the size of California, as it is in the case of Japan, ,the 
land in itself has 'some importance. But what cannot be. measured 
in acres is the .disruption of economic life, as in the case of the fishing 
around Uchinada, and equally important the disruption of cultural 
lifer 
Tim and again the protests voiced by the Japanese people in- 
dude refetences to.the disruptive influence of "GI culture" in wide 
areas surrounding American military installations in Japan. It would 
be a mistake to blame this entirely on criminal acts 'of individual , 
soldiers. Guided by the traditional attitudes -of our federal, state, 
and local governments, a laige segment of our  soldiery goes abroad 
imbued with the idea that non-white people are inferior, and they be- 
have that way. Adding insult to injury, the troops bring with thim ' 
- .  
what is usually considered the scum of American culture--taxi-dance 
halls, steptease, pin-ball' machines, ace7 
, j The old, sore question with all Asians of extraierritdrial rights 
, j  
w v  revived during the' U.S. Occupation, when American personnel 
were held not liable to fapawe laws and Japanese courts. Even to- 
I: 
day, with the Occupation officially over, their liability remains in- ' 
complete. . 1 
: When Asahi, one of JApan's largest and most conservative daily 8; 
newspapers, took a poll on the "Should United States troops 
continue. in Japan?" 16 per cent of the Jwnese people polled re- 
--: 
fused to express an opinion; 27 per cent said yes; and the largest 
group, 47 per cent, said noO8 
- Peasants and villagers hkve not been alone in their protests against 
the presence of foeign troops. Japan's trade unions take an active 
- .,part, for in &any instances their livelihoods are affected as dirdtly . 
as t b ~  of the ~ c h h a d a  fishermen. The General Council of Trade 
, 
Upions, - commonly .known as SOHYO, has a membership of 3,- 
ooo,oqo and is b e  largest labor federation in Japan. Its 1953 con- 
w t i o n  took a strong stand against US. military bases. Army labor 
policies were likewise protested. Workers employed by the Japanese 
gQvermnent to work for the American forces carried out an unprece- . 
d&d @-hour strike last Auguste9 Involved were some g5,ood 
ryxnbers of the National Federation. of Security ~orce i  Workers and 
%~6,ooo of the All-Japan Security Forces Workers. They demanded 
more job security, better grievance &hinery, and iinproved working 
conditions. They protested "the impotency of the reactionary Japanese 
and . . . the arbitrary behavior of the U.S. Armed Fotces 
, authorities.'' 
The sheer physical resistance of the Japanese people to the presence 
and.activities of American troops in their oountry m a y  well be one 
reason why our government is trying desperady to expand Japanese 
military foras: If the lapanese people were eagm $0 build jkdr w n  
militmy rtreng~h in place of American troops, . this "anti-AmeAcan- 
ism" might be takCn at fa;e value. But when we analyze the news 
of the period sin@ Japan regained her sovereignty, we discover in- 
stead a powerful vein of feeling against any kind o f  re#zmamtnt. - 
"Anti-Americanism" arks ,  not from a hatred of the American people 
and all things Ameriq,  but.because it is die United States govern- : 
4 
ment, working with the largest industrial interests and the leaders 
of the most reactionary political parties, which is pushing for Japa- 
nese rearmament. 
It is vitally impoftant for us to trace the sources of the drive for 
pcace and, the drive for war in Japan today. - 
In June 1953 Takutaro Kimura, chief of Japan's National Safety 
Agency bnd a member of Premier Shigeru Yoshida's cabinet, sent 
up a trial balloon: He disclosed the rearmament proposals of a 
group of, Japanese government officials and businessmen: by 1958, 
zoo,ooo men in the National Safety Corps, a body called "army- 
like'' by the New York Timer; 150,ooo tons bf "coastal patrol" 
. vesselt+including 'five aircraft carriers; an air force of ,r,soo mili- 
tary planes, half of them jets. So violent was the Japimese reaction 
to this trial- Exali~~n that even. some members of Yoshida's own' 
party called for Kimura's ouster from the government.1° 
This is 'only one of a number of recent episodes pointing up .the 
sharp conflict between peace forces and war forces in Japan. Poiiti- 
cal. party strength is only part of the story. ' The two chief prwe- 
armament parties, ironically named the Liberal, and Progressive par- 
tics, have been in the saddle of government almost uninterruptedly 
since the end of the war. Facing this parliamentary stronghold a-re 
large numbers of "independents," the rel-atively large right-wing and , 
left-wing Socialist parties, and the smaller Communist Pasty. Taken 
statistidy, the fluctuating success of the opposition parties in terms 
of Diet seats does not fully reflect the power of Japanese aati-re- 
armament keling; this is made obvious by the desperate chiwying 
required of American politicians in order to make Yoshida go more 
, quickly down the road to total rearmament. 
Jap;ui's "Gift Constitution" of 1947, socalled because it was born 
in' American Occupation headquarters and presented to the Japanese 
people, included a famous renunciation-of-war clause which has, not 
yet been officially repealed. The Japanese Peace Treaty dictated ,in 
1951 by John Foster Dulles not only to Japan herself but to the 
other nations which had fought against Japan, did'not make adher- 
ence to the 1947 Constitution compulsory. When asked why it did not, 
Dulles explained in noble phrases-that such adherence could not 
be cokpelled from the outside; to compel it would be to nullify 
Japan's sovereignty.ll Yet while Premier Yoshida was attempting 
to calm his critics by assuring them that no military build-up for 
Japan' was planned, Mr. Dulles, as the new U.S. Secretary of .State, 
announced to the Senate Appropriations Committee that Japanese 
"defense" forces would be increased to 10 divisions (350,000 m&). 
The fresh outcry' from the Japanese people and even from many 
Japanese political leaders forced Dulles to hedge. This was only an 
ultimate goal, he said. "However, all decisions with respect to their 
National Safety Force, and especially with respect to any increase in 
it, will, of cobrse, be made by +e Japanese government and people 
through their governmental process." Then he added with curious 
cynicism, "Once their decisions have been made, whatever they may 
be, we are prepared to help equip these forces."12 
This was in July 1953, only three months after h e  general Japa- 
nese elections in April. Of these elections, William J. Jorden of the 
New-York Times" observed that the results were "regarded as a 
repudiation of any immediate large-scale rearmament by Tapan. . . . 
The parties that suffered the largest loss of strength were the Pro- , 
gressives and the followers of Mr. Hatoyama [a splinter group from , 
Yoshida's Liberal Party], who openly supported a revived Japanese 
, 
army." 
. The Asahi opinion poll mentioned above, taken in June 1953, in- 2 
quired whether it was. wise to comply with the American requests i 
for an expanded National ~ d e t y  Corps, thereby making Japan eligible " 
for more weapons aid as Dulles was promising. 33 per cent ex- % 1 
pressed no opinion, 27 per cent said yes, and the largest group, 40 
' per cent, said no. A similar response was evoked by the question 
whether Japan should get Mutual Security aid from the United States. 
In the face of this surge of anti-rearmament feeling, it is small 
wonder that 'the Yoshida government hesitated for many more 
months, until March of this year, before taking one of the steps de- 
manded by the United States. The Japanese Foreign Minister hastily 
assured an angry Diet, after Dulles' remarks on the National Wety 
Corps, that Japan could not constitutionally accept military aid from 
the United States: But the pressure from American officials and from 
Japanese big business was unremitting. 
U.S. Exerts Pressure 
A large American liews magazine1* complained that Japanese 
officers no lo&er have the moral incentive. to die f a  the Emperor; 1 
6 
"people who deeply respected the old Imperial Army scorn members 
of the Safety Force as American mercenaries." It added: "The 
difficulties in expanding the army and imbuing it with good morale 
partly stem from the fact that the Japanese learned the lessons of the 
last war too well and took the precepts of the occupation too seri- 
ously." American newspaper editorials tobk the whole Japanese na- 
tion to task for failing to comply with American interests. Sena- 
tor Knowland went to Japan and made his threat. 
When Dulles himself went to Japan last August he indulged in 
some rather cynical horse-trading. He announced that the United 
States had decided to give back to Japan a group of ten little islands, 
the Amami Islands, off Kyushu, with a population of 213,000. This 
gift was "generally regarded as an attempt to relieve the opposition 
in Japan to the American occupation."15 But the Amami Islands 
agreement as actually signed last December provided that the United 
States can keep up its military installations in the 'islands and can 
even increase them.16 The New York Times remarked in passing17 
that the inhabitants of the Amamis have been going on periodic hun- 
ger strikes a g a i ~ t  he Arnerican forces for   ears! This was quite a 
gift. 
There was internal as well as external pressure for rearmament. 
Speaking of "the elaborate program already completed by the in- 
dustrialists of the leading [Japanese] economic organizations for 
rebuilding Japin's once powerful arms industry and strengthening 
, her armed forces," the New York Times stated:IO "Japanese arms and 
ammunition makers regard the conclusion of a military assistance 
agreement with the United States as a necessary requirement for 
the revival of their industry." Within two weeks after the Korean 
war began, the Japanese government had offered non-military aid 
to the U.N. forces; happily for Japan's industrialists and her seriously 
sagging economy, this offer brought in U.S. procurement orders to 
the amount of $100 million in the first three months alone. The 
Korean truce had now reduced this important source of income and 
threatened to reduce it further. Only the rearming of Japan, and 
the employment of Japan by the United States as an armaments 
workshop, could save the munitions makers. 
These. combined pressures have had some effect. At the close 
of 1953 a "Constitutional Research Committeeyy was set up by Yosh- 
ida's Liberal Party, to work for. the &peal of the renunciation-of-war 
;lause?@ - Lindsay Parrott reported? "The conservative govern- 
ment, while slowly rearming Japan, has proved extremely reluaant 
to risk a referendum on a constitutional amendment to' permit 
maiptenance of an armed force because of widespread Japanese fears 
that .a new military caste would thus be created." The repeal of the 
~huse, if it comes, will be only a formality. In March 1954 the 
japanese government ~igned a mutual-aid pact with the United 
States, while Ydida's cabinet approved two idraft bills for a "self- 
dcfense"'brce to enable Japan to k r y  out the terms of the pact?' 
The green light has h given for the building o f  Japanese war- 
sbps and other types of a r~~uncnt .  The Toyo Aircraft Company 
had reportedly been engaged for months, with the aid of an Ameri- 
can hI in:making bombers for the French puppet army of Bao 
1Crsli' in Ind~-China?~ Sine the-Indo-China truce at Geneva this re- 
rainkg prop to the Japanese economy has also been removed. 
To continue on this course .in the teeth of Japanese popular oppo- 
sition requires systematic repression of criticism and protest. If 
Japanese rdona r i e s  had not had behind them ,a long tradition 
in the art of repressing protest, they could still have learned a lesson 
from b e  repressive tactics exercised by .the U.S. Occupation after the 
first few months of "democratic refonn." After pointing with pride 
to organized labor movement and the women's and peasants' 
organizations that sprang up in Japan after 1945, Ger~eral MaeArthur 
quickly realized that these workers and peasants were taking too 
seriously their new power and responsibility as citizens of Japan. 
'General strikes were banned in 1947, at the behest of the Occupation, 
and govirnment workers lost their new-won power of collective bar- 
*gaining. Yoshida's group has . continued and ,enhanced the= re- 
pressive policies. 1 
Under government prodding and. by selective firing, leftists were 
driven out of union and pasant' organizations. Leftist leaders were 
arrested under obsolete laws. Communist offices were raided and 
their publications banned. In onef case23 the distributor of a leftist 
publication was arrested and tried under a law providing. punish- 
ment for criticizing the U.S Occupation; when Ta~an regained its 
, 
'8 
sovereignty ib 1952 ;he law had been dropped from the criminal 
code, but the Japanese courts were still using it. When workers at 
U.S. Army Unit 229 in Yokohama mentioned increased produ&on 
in asking for a wage increase, they were charged with disclosing 
military secrets.24 
The "Matsukawa Incident," famous not only in Japan but in ' 
labor movements throughout the world, began when 23 union leaders 
were charged, on questionable evidence, with derailing a train. 
During four years of imprisonment the defendants were tried nu- 
merous times in the lower and higher courts. Gseat protest demon- 
strations were held in their behaif. When the appeal decision was 
handed down at the close of last yyr, U.S. military police were re- 
ported to have swarmed around the courthouse. Four of the union- 
- ists were sentenced to death, four to life imprisonkent, and all but 
three of the others to lesser terms in prisonT6. 
Premier Yoshida's Minister of Education has stated' that one of 
his major -tasks is to destroy the Japanese Teachers Union, 'with 
500,oob members. In January of this iear, this union called its third 
Educational Research Conference; Shigeru Nambara, former president 
of Tokyo University, condemned Yoshida's attempt to revive mili- 
tarist education as an .annex to Japan's rearmament. "Peace, -not 
militarism, is the only way to guarantee Japan's security," he declared. 
. Resolutions were adopted to fight f o ~  pea& and to oppose ''thought 
control'" bills.26 
On February 12, 1954, 'Yoshida's cabinet discussed two measures: 
one which would make it illegal for public school teachers to engage 
in any kind of-political activity, and one to prohibit any organization 
largely composed of teacherss from instigating educators to take po- 
litical action. Protest meetings .against these measures were promptly 
held throughout the country. Even Japan's major newspapers 
unanimously attacked the bills. Conservative Asahi said that the bills 
revealed the government's intention of "making the nation's educa- 
tion serviceable to the state and centralizing it under unified control"; 
Mainichi, another large conservative newspaper, said that the "twisted 
. interpretation of the laws could piace the nation's education system 
mder police control."27 
sharpening attacks like these on freedom of the press, speech, 
how that reaction is sitting only shakily in Japan's 
&-"cr 'j c; CX ' 
9. l t 4 b & e .  g 
parliamentary saddle. Strohg-arm tactics are 'required against the 
drive for peqce, and not the least of these is the agrekment with the 
be used to put down large scale riots and disturbances in Japan. 
, 
1 United States that American armed forces remaining in Japan may i 
i 
Yet such repressive measures have not had the desired success. . 
Even the Communist Party, according to New~week?~ has made a l j  
"resounding" comeback since its low poiat of 60,ooo members in 4 
1951. Its "New Program," brought forward at the end of 1951, Y 
describes Japan's present position as that of a colonial country under 
the domination ,of the United States, and calls for a national coali- 
tion of most Japanese economic and political groupings except those 
politicians and businessmen who profit from co11aboration with 
American businessmen and diplomats. The goals of the proposed 
. coalition inhded  the shaking off of American influence, the building 
of a economy where civilian industry can flourish, the 
. 
settlement of agrariah problems and the reclamation of land now 
considered not arable. -Aims such as these were bound tp receive in- 
. creasing support. 
-Sohyo, the largest trade union federation, was originally created 
by the US. occupation in 1950 with the intention of making it a 
right-wing organization. The latest effort to unseat the militant 
leadership of Japan's, largest, 3,000,ooo-strong labor federation failed 
when, in July 1954, the delegates to the National Convention of the 
General Council of Japanese Trade Unions re-elected Minoru 
Takano to the post of Geoeral Secretary. Mr. Takano has been a re- 
lentless fighter for the economic demands of the Japanese workers 
as well as an outspoken advocate of the re-establishment of normal 
relationdiplomatic and commercial-with the Chinese mainland 
and the Soviet Union. He has opposed rearmament and the presence 
of U.S. bases in Japan. Today Sohyo is carrying on a vocal and 
active struggle for peace asd economic reform; it has been forced to 
the struggle by the needs and energies of its own rank and file. 
The programs of organizations like Sohyo in Japan today show a 
lively awareness of the fact that large political and economic issues 
are always closely intertwined. The political battles of these Japanese 
workers are bound up with, and in fact stem from, the& economic 
needs. In our American labor movement today an attempt has been 
made, with some success, to separate the demand for peace from the 
demand for porkchops. The connection between the two is even 
more clear and pressing. in Japan than it is here today. For the Japa- 
nese people the fight against rearmament and against American 
domination goes hand in hand with the fight for a decent livelihood. 
II., CCWe Will Not Lead a Miserable Life 
Any Longer9' 
The magnitude, vigor, and organization of Japanese workers' 
demonstrations has increased in spite of heavy-handed government 
threats and repression. In the spring of 1952 Japan was about to 
regain her sovereignty with a peace treaty promising continued 
American domination, and *the Yoshida government was preparing 
legislation which would make trade unions liable for dissolution 
if they opposed government policies. On April 18 of that year over 
8oo~ooo Japanese union members took part in a general work stop 
page protesting not only the anti-labor legislation but also the con- 
tinuing presence of American troops, and asking for decent wage 
le~els.2~ Support for this demonstration came from thousands of 
students and other strata of the Japanese population., 
In July 1953 some three million workers carried on a suia of 
"lightning" str&es against a new law banning strikes in pub- 
lic ~ervices.~ Last December nearly a million members of the nine 
member unions of the National Council of Public Enterprise Work- 
ers left their jobs in demonstrations for yearend bonuses to eke out 
their payF1 Sohyo delegates met with government officials and 
warned them not to interfere with the demonstrations. Such was the 
unity of feeling in the Sohyo federation that any attempt at inter- 
ference would bring on a general strike. 
These are only samplings from a tremendous struggle. ,What 
are the basic facts behind this struggle? According to US. News 
and World Repa?, an American business magazine, Japanese pro- 
duction had risen by 1952 to 40 per cent above its prewar level,- 
while the standard of living was estimated at 15 per cent below 
prewar. Urban people, in fact, were 25-30 per cent poorer than before 
the war.a2 It should be recalled that during this period the Korean 
war was still creating an artificial boom in Japan. 
That industrial boom, created by U.S. p r o c u r k t  buying, w 
I I I 3ii;i.s 
very remunerative to Japanese industrialists; it never filtered down to 
the bulk of the working people. Before the Korean war the Japanese 
livirig standard had recovered to 75 per cent of the 1930-34 level 
(a low enough. level to sart with); after the Korean war began, 
prices rose-some 50 per cent and "the government has shown neither 
the ability to cope. with inflation nor the inclination to strengthen the 
social security  system."^ 
Official estimates of non-agricultural unemployment for that year 
of 1'952, before the boom ended with the Korean truce, ran between 
400,000 and 500,000. The Financid Times of London, in its issue of 
July 5, 1954, reported that an o&ial survey of unemployment in 
Japan between March and May, 1954 was ccmserv&ively estimated 
at 4 million or about 11 per cent of the +total labor force of 36.2 
m i l .  The Ti- c o ~ e n t e ~  that "Unemployment now is be- 
lieved ta be mirch higher. Industrial layoffs and the number of un- 
employment bendciaries have shown a marked increase.from month 
to month." - 
A 1952 estimate by farm exped4  stated that the Japanese farm- 
ing industry could absorb a total of about 13 million farm workers; 
yet even during the Korean war, when presumably some firm labor 
was siphoned of3 into 0th.e; industries, Japan had 18 million farm 
worker- economic surplus of 5 million. To this situation, as far 
as farming people are concerned, must be added the inherent dangers 
of the American Occupation's land reform- program, under which 
govemmkt compensation of landowners for land redistributed gave 
than the opportunity to buy back their land under ''dummy" owner- 
ships. 
The ''austerity drive" now being waged by the Japanese govern- 
. . 
-0 &t is openly aimed at reducing non-military spending only; it 
stems dearly from the rearmament drive abetted by the US. Part 
of this program, dmittcd to the Japanese cabinet by the Adminis- 1 trative Supervision Board at the end of 1953, is a 3-year plan to dis- '.$ 
miss ever 110,ooo government workers, of whom 25,000 work for 1 
I 4 govemment-owned railways9 Economy was only part of the rno- 
#- : 
tive; the government also planned to dismiss a number of railroad 
union leaders, charging that they led the recent year-end campaign 
.,: 
for wage increases. Instantly responding to this threat, both the +; 
union involved and the newly organized Council of Public Workers .' 
b i o n s  planned ddwdowns .and other measures to C o m b  it.- 
- In a further "austerity" move aimed at those who could least afford 
it, Premier Yoshida in his draft budget for 1954 called for a cut in' . 
unemployment benefit appropriations. This roused a further storm 
of protest f r m  Japanese workers. The New York Times reportedP 
"For the f o d  consrmtive day several thousand men from wo 
casual laborers unions picketed the Finance Ministry'waving Red 
banners and demanding no reduction in funds ht unemployment 
relief?. 
While social security expenditures were thus to be reduced, militaq 
funds in the 1954 draft budget were increased to 163 billion yen, 
including 61 billion yen as "oceupitim funds.''88 
This emphasis on military spending, and the peculiar exigencies 
of berican foreign policy have cast the Japanese economy in .a 
mold in. which no economy can survive for long. The darnage, 
though severest in the workers' livelihood, extends considerably be- 
yond, into the ranks of small and middle-sized business. The woPdsPds 
"We will not starve quietly" comrmriously e n o u g h o t  from a - 
worker but from an Osaga industrialist, quoted in US. News and 
World RepiH9 The two major factors against which both workers 
and smaller businesses have to fight in Japan today are these: the.rci ' 
b i d  and continued growth of monopoly, stamping out smaller ' 
competitors in their hundreds; and the American-imposed rcsaictions 
on trade with China, which could provide many of the rkw materials 
needed by Japan's consumer industries. . 
Back in 1948 a conservative Americap economist, a f k  a long 
and careful study of Japan's postwar economic problems, concluded 
that "Basic solutio~s for Japan can come only with the complete 
integration of its economy with &OM* of all other Far Eastern 
countries . . . the longer this economic rapprochement in Asia is de- 
layed, the more costly and the less successful will be United States 
darts in Japan a l ~ n e . " ~  
A number of Asian countries have bcea hesitant about trading 
I 
with ~ a ~ a n *  si ce the end of World War 11. Japanese trade with 
as been patchy because of still un- 
damages. Former victims of Japan's 
13 
military and konomic aggression fear the r eb id  of that aggressive 
drive; with reason, in view of the rapid rebuilding of Japan's top- 
heavy plonopolistic structure. As former colonial counkies struggle 
toward a more -industrial future, however, there is a great net$ in 
Asia for Japan's peacetime capital goods and consumer ,goods, while 
Japanese business needs many materials which it can secure em- 
nomically only ih other parts f Asia. 
Japan's neighbor,- China, is her nearest and largest potential 
source and market. But by American orders Japan's trade with China 
has been heavily restricted. Without the China trade, Japan's foreign 
trade deficit is kept moderate only by her largely artificial and tem- 
prary receipts from U.S. procurement orders, tourism, and spending 
by foreign soldiers in Japan. Of the total ~f $800 million in these 
"invisible exports" in 195% U.S. special procurement accounted for :. 
$400 million:" Despite this temporary compensation due to thc 
-,. 
Korea war, the foreign trade deficit over-all had reached $n5 , 
million in 1953, and a deficit of 5200 million was predicted by the 
- 
Bank of Japan for 1g54"2 . 
Forced by American policy, Japan now buys many items in the 
dollar market which she could obtain more econmieally in Asia 
($9 a ton foi Chinese coal, for example, as against $32 a ton for , 
American coal"). On the other hand, the Yoshida governdent has 
recently been forced to cut the prices of Japanese export commodities, - 
so that, according to figures published in Japan's leading financial J 
daily, Sangyo Keizai Shin~bun,"~ an item like Japanese-manufactured 
cotton yarn costs 193 yen per pound outside Japan and 232 yen per 
pound inside Japan. 
. 
Japanese United For China Trade 
To impose these trade policies on Japan, as our government has 
done, ampunts to throttling one's ally to spite one's enemy. The . 
"throttled" Japanese businessmen can hardly be expected to see eye to 
, 
eye with American strategists on this subject. On July 29, 1953, 
the lower house of the Japanese Diet unanimously approved a reso- . 
lution which said in part: "Japanese industry is now groaning amidst 
a deep economic crisis. . . . With the signing of the Korean armistice 
agreement, the Japaneie government should act in accordance with thc 
- 1 
wish of the majority of the people and smash the obstacles and pro- . 
- 8 
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mote trade with China."45 In October a group of Japanese Diet mem- 
bers and businessmen toured the Chinese People's Republic, their 
. 
expenses reportedly paid by their government. Their party a ia t ions  
ranged all the way from the right-wing Liberal and Progressive par- 
. ties to the Farmer-Labor and Communist parties. The industries they 
represented included auto, steel, marine products, shipbuilding, and 
textile?6 , 
Upon his 'return from China one of these Diet members, a Japa- 
nese businessman, was interviewed in some detail by Robert P. Mar- 
tin, Far Eastern Editor of U.S. News and World R e ~ t ? ~  Diet 
member Ikeda reported in this interview that tentative contracts had 
been signed during his visit for 400,000 tons of Chinese coking cod, 
300,000 tons of salt, and other items. He said that the Chinese had 
made "great strides," and added: "I think it would help prevint 
another war if the United States, instead of remaining hostile, would 
have friendly relations with Red China. I hope the Americans will 
understand that the Japanese people believe this." 
Owners of small and middle-sized businesses in Japan have dis- 
covered an area of common interest with the Japanese working 
people-not only on the question of trade with China, but also on 
the pressing issues of building a stiong peacetime economy unbur- 
dened by monopoly. In May 1953 the League of Japanese Medium 
and Small Business Organizations, the All Japan Middle and Small 
Industries Society, and three other similar organizations made a 
joint Etatement protesting the economic policies of the Liberal and 
Progressive parties in the administration. These policies, said the 
businessmen, were aimed at relaxing the anti-monopoly laws which 
now exist on paper and crushing small and medium business through 
inequitable taxation.48 
These businessmen, along with their far more numerous allies, 
the working people of Japan, are daily made aware of the tremen- 
dous distortion in the distribution of economic benefits and ecp- 
nomic power in Japan today. According to recent United Nations 
figures, Japanese industrial output is growing faster than that of any 
other non-Communist country in the world. During the third quar- 
ter of 1953 it was 23 per cent higher than in the same quarter of the 
preceding year. Yet living standards lag far behind and bankruptcies 
continue at an alarming rate. 
s 
15 
Then what is happening to Japan's national wealth? Is it "leaking 
, 
out at the .seams," into the pockpockets of the admittedly noplerous a 
suwssful black rnarketeers, and into the financial scandals $at 
, have rocked the highest levels of lapanese gwemment more than 
once since the war? Even large-scale qrruption of this kind 
starkly account for the present state of Japan's economy. 
ZdbatsumWali Street, New Postwar Partaerhip 
The conservative newspaper Asahi published lait year the follow- 
, ing figures f&m ' the Japanese ' Revenue Offi~e:'~ in 1951, 36 top 
corpora&ons in Japan earned a total of about $5.5 million; in 1952, 
the saw mount was earned by 15 top corporations. Largest earn- - 
in& were rung up by the Bank of Japan, Hitachi Factory, Oji Paper 
Wi, Mi:tsui Metal, Mihubishi Electric, Uitsui Mine, Mitsubishi 
M+, Yd-ta Steel, Jujo Paper Mill, and Joban Mine. The reader . 
will recognize at l& some of these firms as belonging to, or as con- - 
wUed by, the industrial royal families of Japan-the Zaibatsu. Kt? 
At the end of 1953 it was estimated that the old Zaibatsu fami- ' 
lies now control 45% of Japan's coal, 65% of her shipbuilding, 
50% of the ammonium sulphate industry, and 50% of the electrolytic ' 
coppa industryPO The ten companies making the biggest profits 
in the first nine months of 1953 were all Zaibatrusontrolled. - 
The famous Pauleg report on .Japanese reparations, made by a@ 
- American expert commission early in the occupation, declarql that . 
the Zaibatsu "are the 'greatest war potential of Japan. It was they' 
who made possible all .Japan's conquests and aggressions. . . . Not' 
only were the ~ a i b a t s ~  as responsible for Japan's militarism as the 
militarists thkselves, but they ,profited immensely from it. Euen 
-,'in &fear, they have mtdZy strengthened $heir mmopdy pazi- 
I 
iim [italics mine].. : -. . As long as the Zaibatsu survive, Jap 
be their Jd~an.''~l 
On paper, the U.S. Occupation f'broke upy" the Zaibatsu h 
early in the postwar period. A top1 of 325 Japanese firms were 
originally slated for '~stmcturd reorganization"-i.e, breaking up of 
kondpolies. But in r 948 the Draper- Johnston mission visited Japan, 
ostensibly to determine how much in the way of war damage repara- 
tions Japan could afford to part with. Major-General Draper, as it 
happened, had hen largely responsible for the decision to halt the 
1.6 
decartelization of German industry and restore its potential. Percy 
Johnston was Chairman of the Chemical -Bank & Trust Co. As a 
direct, result of their mission, Occupation officials announced (in May, 
1948) that 194 of the 325 Japanese firms would be excused from 
"reorganization." Later in the year still more firms were excused.= 
The same ominous pattern shows itself in the "purge" from 
public activity of the men held responsible for Japanese aggression. 
Of ;95,273 Japanese war lords, militarists and government officials 
"purged" by the U.S. Occupation in the first flush of .democratic 
reform, over 177,000 had already-by I gsx-been depurged by order 
of former Occupation authorities and the Yoshida governmentb3 
Release was promised to the remaining .IS-. It would be un- 
realistic to expect that a few years of "retirement" could change 
the motivatibns of these power-hungry men. Their' careers have em 
bodied all the poisonous traditions of Japanese feidalisp and mili 
tarism. "In addition to retbrning to public life such prominent per. 
sons as ex-Finance Minister Ishibashi, former Police Chid Tana- 
kawa, the former President of the Liberal Party, Ichiro Hatoyama 
and important members of the old Zaibatsu, the Yoshida government 
has 'depurged' former officers and directors of thc imperial Rule. 
Assistance Association and its amiated Youth Association. . . . 
More than 1,326 pqons purged because of their connections with the 
'thought police' have already been cleared."" 
American officials and the reactionary Japanese government have 
worked hand in glovp to rcIease this poison once more into the ' 
national bloodstream of Japan. With the "purgees" back on the 
scene, it might be said that there is only one new character in the 
Japanese drama: the American big businessman, who has moved in 
on the Japanese big. businessman to control him and to share with him 
in the profits from Japan's lopsided boom. 
During the American occupation of Japan .over $3.5 billion- 
representing 75 per cent of all capital invested-was invest4 by 
American big business in Japanese industry. The names of these 
investors loom large among America's m "Zaibatsu." In 1950 
Du Pant, Ford, and westinghouse- International invested $600 
million in Japanese industry. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. now con- 
trols 51 per cent of the stock of the East Asiatic Fuel Co. of Japan. 
Reynolds Metals (aluminum) has captured half the stock in the 
Japan Light Metals Co. International Standard Electric controls 
the Japanese Electric Co, and Surnitomo Electric, while Westing- 
house is firmly entrenched in the Mitsubishi Electric Co. General. . 
Electric dominates the giant Shibaura' Electric Co. American Lead 
Manufacturing has acquired control of the Nippon Chemical Works. 
Dillon, Read controls the Japanese textile industry. 
Remembering this tremendous investment and the specific in- 
vestors, the alignment of opposing political and economic forces in 
Japan today becomes vividly clear. Arrayed against the vital in- 
terests of the Japanese workers and small businessmen stand the 
Japanese and American industrial overlords. From this industrial 
oligarchy, reactionary Japanese politicians like Yoshida draw their 
inspiration and their power. Thanks to the intervention of Ameri- 
can bkinessmen, '~a~anese h avy industry was never forced to pay 
back to victimized Asian nations more than a tiny fraction of the 
war damages incurred on behalf of the Zaibatsu. Thanks to the 
intervention of the same American interests, General MacArthur 
and his Occupation forces promptly proceeded to undo in practice 
all the economic reforms proposed by the democratic nations which 
had just defeated the forces of fascism. 
Out of the community of interests between the Zaibatsu and Wall 
Street have come the drive for rearmament' and the drive for 
strengthened monopoly. Into that community has been sucked the 
harvest of Japanese production, leaving the Japanese working people 
high and dry. But the hard new factor for big businessmen and 
diplomats of both countries-the significant factor that must be 
taken into account by American citizens-is the community of in- , 
terest between the smaller businessmen of Japan and the active, 
revitalized masses of Japanese workers. 
"We want neither to Zead or nmiserable ZiPe any 
Zonger, nor to be dragged into another roar." 
These words are being repeated in Japan today in - a thousand 
forms; carried on posters; echoed in unanimous resolutions by large 
union organizations, women's groups, peasant groups, and small 
business associations; they are sounding even in the popular books 
and movies of Japan. Repressive legislation and the activities of the 
% 
Japanese police testify t o  the fact that the Zaibatsu-Wall Street all;- 
ance is having nightmares. 
In sum, the most reactionary elements of Japanese and American 
power have laid out a path for Japan's future: 
Ever-increasing military spending, to be compensated by cuts in 
government payrolls, in social security and unemployment 
funds; 
Continued emphasis on war manufactures, and increased control 
by American and Japanese monopoly, regardless of the da,mage 
done to the rest of the economy; . 
Maintenance in power and influence of those corrupt, tradition- 
' rooted politicians and militarists whose type was rampant in pre- 
war Japan; 
Continuing depression of the Japanese standard of living; and 
Intensdying suppression of all popular protest against this course. 
' The' path is laid out, but the Japanese government is having to 
walk very slowly indeed. Yoshida and his friends have long since 
realized what American citizens must quickly learn-that the Japa- 
nese "common man" is fighting tooth and nail, in increasing num- 
bers, against a path that can have only war and starvation at the 
end of it. 
It must become evident to widening circles of American citizens 
that the money we are spending in Japan for armament and "mutual 
security" is a liability rather than an investment. Our money is not 
contributing to the  basic welfare of the whole Japanese people but 
to the profit of a few. This method of winning allies has failed in the 
past. The pattern bears an unmistakable resemblance .to other U.S. 
efforts in the Far East which have resulted in the blunders, catastro- 
phes and defeats of U.S. foreign policy in Asia and has made our 
country an object of suspicion and hostility in that part of the world. 
Our own best interest surely lies in a Japan that is economically 
healthy and capable of a peaceful existence among its Asian neighbors 
and in the world. This means rejecting the kind of American foreign 
policy which is now supporting Japan's munitions makers and "re- 
formed" imperialists. It means giving Japan the real independence 
she needs in order to work o i t  her tremendous problems. 
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